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Abstract
Inspired by Maschler and Owen (1989), we provide a dynamic approache to the multi-choice
Shapley value proposed by Hsiao and Raghavan (1992,1993) under plurality-efficiency.
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A multi-choice TU game, introduced by Hsiao and Raghavan (1992,1993),
is a generalization of a TU game in which each player has several activity
levels. There are several branches of solutions for these games that are
extensions of the Shapley value in literature. In this paper, we apply the
multi-choice Shapley value proposed by Hsiao and Raghavan (1992,1993),
which we name the H&R Shapley value.
Maschler and Owen (1989) characterized a consistent Shapley value
for hyperplane games. Subsequently, they also provided a dynamic ap-
proach that lead the players to the consistent solution, starting from an
arbitrary Pareto optimal payoﬀ vector.
Based on the result of Maschler and Owen (1989), we oﬀer an analogue
result for the H&R Shapley value. Speciﬁcally, for the H&R Shapley
value, we deﬁne an x-dependent reduced games. Furthermore, we show
how the H&R Shapley value can be reached dynamically from an payoﬀ
vector which is plurality-eﬃcient in some games. The dynamic process
should make some use of the consistency.
2 Deﬁnitions and Notation
Let U be the universe of players and N ⊆ U be a set of players. Let
m = (mi)i∈N be the vector that describes the number of activity levels
for each player, in which he can actively participate. For i ∈ U, we set
Mi = {0,1,··· ,mi} as the action space of player i, where the action 0
means not participating, and M
+
i = Mi \ {0}. For N ⊆ U, N 6= ∅, let
MN =
Q
i∈N Mi be the product set of the action spaces for players in N.
Denote the zero vector in RN by 0N.
A multi-choice TU game is a triple (N,m,v), where N is a non-
empty and ﬁnite set of players, m is the vector that describes the number
of activity levels for each player, and v : MN → R is a characteristic func-
tion which assigns to each action vector x = (xi)i∈N ∈ MN the worth
that the players can obtain when each player i plays at activity level
xi ∈ Mi with v(0N) = 0. If no confusion can arise a game (N,m,v) will
sometimes be denoted by its characteristic function v. Given (N,m,v)
and x ∈ MN, we write (N,x,v) for the multi-choice TU subgame ob-
tained by restricting v to {y ∈ MN | yi ≤ xi ∀i ∈ N} only. Denote the
class of all multi-choice TU games by MC.
Given (N,m,v) ∈ MC, let LN,m = {(i,j) | i ∈ N,j ∈ M
+
i }. A









Here ψi,j(N,m,v) is the power index or the value of the player i when he
takes action j to play game v. For convenience, given (N,m,v) ∈ MC
and a solution ψ on MC, we deﬁne ψi,0(N,m,v) = 0 for each i ∈ N.
Given S ⊆ N, let |S| be the number of elements in S, and let eS(N)






1 if i ∈ S ,
0 otherwise .
Note that if no confusion can arise eS(N) will be denoted by eS. Given
(N,m,v) ∈ MC and x ∈ MN, we deﬁne S(x) = {k ∈ N | xk 6= 0}.
Let x,y ∈ RN, we say y ≤ x if yi ≤ xi for all i ∈ N. The analogue
of unanimity games for multi-choice games are minimal eﬀort games
(N,m,ux





1 if y ≥ x ;
0 otherwise
Hsiao and Raghavan (1992,1993) showed that for (N,m,v) ∈ MC it





N, where ax(v) =
P
S⊆S(x)(−1)|S| v(x − eS).
Deﬁnition 1 Hsiao and Raghavan (1992,1993) proposed a multi-choice
Shapley value, the H&R Shapley value. We denote the symmetric
form of the H&R Shapley value by γ. Formally, the H&R Shapley value
γ is the solution on MC which associates with each (N,m,v) ∈ MC,
each i ∈ N and each j ∈ M
+









For x ∈ RN, we write xS to be the restriction of x at S for each S ⊆ N.
Let N ⊆ U, i ∈ N and x ∈ RN, we introduce the substitution notation
x−i to stand for xN\{i} and let y = (x−i,j) ∈ RN be deﬁned by y−i = x−i
∗We deﬁne the H&R Shapley value in terms of the dividends. Hsiao and Raghavan
(1993) provided an alternative formula of the H&R Shapley value.
2and yi = j. In this paper, we will make use of the following axioms: Let
ψ be a solution on MC.




The following axioms are analogues of the balanced contributions
property due to Myerson (1980).
• Strong balanced contributions (SBC): For each (N,m,v) ∈ MC


















Upper Balanced Contributions (UBC) only requires that SBC holds
if ki = mi and kj = mj.
• Independence of individual expansions (IIE)†: For each (N,m,v) ∈









= ··· = ψi,j(N,m,v).
Weak independence of individual expansions (WIIE) only re-
quires that IIE holds if |S(m)| = 1.
Theorem 1 (Hwang and Liao (2006))
1. A solution ψ on MC satisﬁes EFF, IIE, and UBC if and only if
ψ = γ.
2. A solution ψ on MC satisﬁes EFF, WIIE, and SBC if and only if
ψ = γ.
Interpretation : Given (N,m,v) ∈ MC. In the usual TU setting the
basic assumption is that the grand coalition N forms, and consequently
that v(N) is the amount that has to be divided. Therefore a payoﬀ vector
is a vector (xi)i∈N where xi is the amount paid to player i, and eﬃciency
dictates that
P
i∈N xi = v(N), all the gains (or maybe losses) are to be
divided among the participants. In the framework of multi-choice games,
the basic assumption is still that the grand coalition N forms, and con-
sequently there are many cooperative situations of N. This means that
†This axiom was introduced by Hwang and Liao (2006).
3for each z ∈ MN with zi 6= 0 for all i ∈ N, it is possible that v(z) is the
amount that has to be divided. Therefore a payoﬀ vector is a “conﬁgura-
tion” (xi,j)(i,j)∈LN where xi,j is the amount paid to player i corresponding
to his activity level j when player i participates at his activity level j.
In order to reach the maximal beneﬁt of “individuality”, each individ-
uality hopes that all other players are supposed to participate at their
maximum level of eﬀort when he participates at his activity level j in a
game. Hence we will only concern that “all other players are supposed
to participate at their maximum level of eﬀort”. A particular situation
is that “all players participate at their maximum level of eﬀort”, which
is also most interesting situation. The deﬁnition of the corresponding
concept of eﬃciency are as the deﬁnition as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 Given (N,m,v) ∈ MC and x ∈ RLN,m. x satisﬁes Plurality-










Note that if there exists (N,m,v) such that a solution satisﬁes PEFF in
(N,m,v), then it satisﬁes EFF in (N,m,v).
For S ⊆ N, we denote Sc = N \ S and 0S the zero vector in RS.
Given a solution ψ, (N,m,v) ∈ MC, and ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, the reduced
game (S,mS,v
ψ











• Consistency (CON): For all (N,m,v) ∈ MC, for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, for






Theorem 2 (Hwang and Liao (2006)) The solutions γ satisfy CON.
44 Dynamic Approaches
In this section, we will ﬁnd a dynamic process that lead the players to so-
lutions, starting from an arbitrary payoﬀ vector which satisﬁes plurality-
eﬃciency in a game. The dynamic process should make some use of the
consistency. In order to exhibit such process, let us deﬁne an (x,γ)-
dependent reduced game:
Deﬁnition 3 Given (N,m,v) ∈ MC, S ⊆ N and x ∈ RLN,m be a payoﬀ
vector which satisﬁes PEFF in (N,m,v). The (x,γ)-reduced game
(S,mS,vx
















Given (N,m,v) ∈ MC with N ≥ 3, (i,j) ∈ LN,m and solution γ,
deﬁne fi,j : MN → R to be













where α is a ﬁxed postive number, which reﬂects the assumption that
player i does not ask for full correction (when α = 1) but only (usually)
a fraction of it. By the PEFF of x and the deﬁnitions of (x,γ)-reduced




(i,j)∈LN,m also satisﬁes PEFF
in (N,m,v). Deﬁne f = (fi,j)(i,j)∈LN,m and x0 = x, x1 = f(x0), x2 =
f(x1),··· , xq = f(xq−1) for all q ∈ N.
Theorem 3 Given (N,m,v) ∈ MC such that γ satisﬁes PEFF in (N,m,v).
If 0 < α < 4
|N|, then for each vector x ∈ RLN,m which satisﬁes PEFF in
(N,m,v), {xq}∞





Proof. Given (N,m,v) ∈ MC such that γ satisﬁes PEFF in (N,m,v).
And given i,k ∈ S(m) and a vector x ∈ RLN,m which satisﬁes PEFF in


















γ,S) (by IIE of γ)
= γi,j(S,(((mS)−i,j)−k,0),vx
γ,S) − γk,mk(S,((mS)−i,0),vx



























S,m) − xi,j + xk,mk.
(2)
By (1), (2) and CON of γ,



































































If 0 < α < 4













Corollary 1 If 0 < α < 4
|N|, then for each (N,m,v) ∈ MC and for
each eﬃcient vector x ∈ RLN,m, {(xq)i,mi}∞
q=1 converges geometrically to
γi,mi(N,m,v) for all i ∈ S(m).
Proof. The proof of Corollary 1 is similar to Theorem 3, we omit it.
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